Coming off the second part of my review of Richard Staley’s Einstein’s Generation, and also to try and set a tone for this year’s blogging, I’d like to consider the question of the instrumental uses of history. I want to start with the idea that history is an inevitable component of argumentation. Some other term might prove more convenient later on, but for the moment I want to say that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to open a discussion without invoking history in some way.
The point might be made by reference to comments in a recent discussion at the History of Economics Playground blog. There one question is whether or not economists can get away with shoddy history when they start out with the claim that they “are not historians of economic thought”. Yann takes the case to an extreme by pointing out that you could say, “Well, I’m not a physicist, but here’s some thoughts about physics for my fellow economists,” and physicists would have every right to call them on their errors. However, physics is not an inevitable component of economic argumentation (as it might be for engineering argumentation), whereas it might be convenient to refer to the history of economics in making an economic argument without assuring the audience of the quality of the history.
I think this point is generalizable. Since the past provides us with the experience from example necessary to understanding the present, the past necessarily becomes a topic of conversation. In this instance, history becomes a sort of shadow philosophy, a set of exemplary episodes that demonstrate certain principles, which then can be invoked to discuss current situations. Since this kind of history is really more philosophy than it is history, it is less important that the history actually be gotten right (however much it might irk historians when clichés and myths are repeated ad nauseam). “Why Kennedy won in 1960”, “Why Reagan won in 1980”, “Why Carter lost in 1980”, all become stock examples to be used for evaluating future Presidential campaigns. Naturally a more nuanced understanding of history will provide a better set of stock examples, but we can get away with having unsound history if the principles underlying the examples we use are adequate to the tasks we face.
Likewise, history must necessarily be invoked to understand why it is we are in the situation we are, why we have certain problems to work on, and certain intellectual, cultural, and physical resources to deal with them. Understanding others’ background can help explain the motivations for their actions, particularly when those motivations or actions seem unintuitive. Understanding different constituencies’ histories can also help assign current responsibility. If one side in a conflict has historically suffered as a consequence of another side’s unprovoked actions, brokering a peace might not be so simple as stopping the fighting, since some sort of reparation for past injury, or assurance that unprovoked action would not be taken again, would be expected. Similarly, if certain constituencies have not historically had access to the advantages enjoyed by other constituencies, it might be thought just or wise to provide those constituencies with special assistance.
In these instances history is in one sense simply instrumental to defining current conditions (defining resources, defining expected rights, articulating feelings of suspicion, etc.), and what matters is not so much an accurate history but an accurate definition of conditions. Furthermore, in these instances, different constituencies might have less of an interest in arriving at an accurate history than in deploying history in such a way that it makes present conditions appear as favorable to them as possible, diminishing historians’ possible usefulness and likely embroiling them in the rhetoric of controversy. (In discussion, Chris Donohue has informed me of Jürgen Habermas’ use of the the idea of history as a “balancing of accounts” or a “settlement of damages” to describe this vein of history, which is very much to-the-point.)
If history is inevitable to present deliberation, if a fully accurate understanding of history is unnecessary (or undesirable!) to carrying out present deliberation, and if professional historians are unlikely to have a fully accurate understanding of history themselves, then historians find themselves less in the position of the physicist, and very much in the position of the economist. All policies (corporate or government), to be legitimate (to shareholders or to constituents), must have some rationale as to why they are expected to be effective, which convey certain implicit or explicit principles. Policymakers do not require that these accord with the best available economic principles; economics (or some other political or social science) is in some way inevitable to the act of policymaking.
The question for historians, then, is: given the inevitability of history to everyday life, what role can the historian reasonably expect to play?
In theory, historians could assign themselves the task of correcting bad history where and when they see it. Such a task would be a major burden on historians’ time (taking time away from the task of them making themselves better historians), it would likely have little effect on actual action since accurate history was never really at issue, and it would also augment historians’ reputation for obnoxiousness, placing them in the same category as the grammatical scold. (Grammar, of course, is inevitable to language, but good grammar is not necessary to adequate communication. Personally, I try to never split infinitives in my official writing, but don’t worry about it here.)
In practice, historians need a far better understanding of the instrumental uses of history in order to pick their battles intelligently. If present actors are committed to using history to understand the principles underlying their actions, historians have a clear and consistent role to play. If principles turning on historical myths are being systematically deployed in controversies, then historians (assuming they approve of the other side’s cause) might make the opposite side aware of those myths (but should disabuse themselves of the efficacy of their continual intervention, since controversies where one side demands victory—or at least perpetual principled opposition—are unlikely to be resolved through reasoned intervention). If historians see history being used as a weapon, but do not wish to take sides, they can publish a general correction for those wanting one, but should probably not expect their work to be as widely read as that of those who use history instrumentally. Professional historians should consider themselves under obligation never to consciously distort the historical record for political purposes, though the role of the “corrective” with political implications, I think, remains unresolved.
Historians of science also need to be more sympathetic to instrumental uses of history put to ends other than accurate history. Philosophers may make bad historians from time to time, but just because the history of science does not “work” philosophically, better methods of securing knowledge require philosophical work, which requires instrumental uses of history to examine what sufficient conditions are required for securing knowledge, much as a sociologist like Harry Collins might ask what sufficient conditions of trust are required for securing the acceptance of knowledge. Likewise, as Richard Staley points out, scientific work requires a pruning and redefinition of individual narratives to recommend collective paths forward. Historians of science should undo all these instrumental uses to recover a more accurate history, they should make these instrumental uses of history subjects of historical investigation themselves, and they should not be too upset when others cannot be bothered to share their passion for accurate history.