History and Historiography of Science

Where did all the scientists go?

A bedtime story.

Once upon a time, most historians of scientists were Scientists who took an interest in history. They had a close relationship to the Philosophers. In fact, the origins of the field are usually traced to Harvard President James B. Conant’s desire to find out How Science Works. They did some pretty good work, but took too many things to be Obvious that were actually quite Problematic. So, some Analysts became involved, and made some Notable Contributions. Soon the Analysts only wanted to talk amongst themselves, and eventually the Science Wars broke out, and this made the Scientists go away, and thus the Analysts had the history of science all to themselves. The End.

I think most everyone now agrees that the science wars were absurd; but I haven’t heard much talk of rebuilding from the rubble. Frankly, I miss the scientists (yes, of course, there are plenty who are still around, but we’re painting in broad strokes here). Sure, they weren’t the best historians in the world, and most of them weren’t willing to follow the rest of us into some really interesting questions, but there are a lot of deep thinkers out there among their ranks. Here at the AIP, we are actually closer to them than to academic science studies. But much of the talk seems to be “heritage this” and “preservation that” (commensurate with the fact that the History Center is basically a co-entity with the fabulous Niels Bohr Library and Archives). Going back to square one, there’s a reason why there was so much enthusiasm for the history of science after World War II, and it wasn’t all about justifying public expenditure. I’ll compact the way I see it into a pithy sentence: history makes us more aware of the assumptions underlying practices (whether in history or today).

I think we need to put more effort into putting out the kinds of studies that scientists actually find professionally interesting. Personally, I know Dave Kaiser’s work on Feynman diagrams, which is read in the physics community, and also managed to receive the HSS Pfizer Prize. Hopefully if we do good enough work and practice good enough outreach, we might see some more interesting discussions about practice in the scientific communities as well. Then maybe the philosophers can come in from the cold, too. That’s not really my field, though. I just don’t want scientists to think of what I do as an antiquarian enterprise.

New Title

OK, how about “Waves in the Ether”? It seems a little corny, but it is appropriate for both the history of science and its internet medium. “Ether Wave Propaganda” is also a contender, but I’m not sure the pun on “propagation” is apparent enough, and, even if it is apparent, whether it’s not too cutesy to use a pun. Anyway, I’ll put it up there on a trial basis to see how the aesthetics are.

Edit: You know what? I kind of like the propaganda title better. Let’s see how that works.

Edgerton’s Justification Criterion

David Edgerton has a new short article on including the history of chemistry in the history of twentieth century science and technology, which can be found here. It’s pretty much in-line with Edgerton’s usual arguments, but in light of the discussion I’ve been having with myself here, concerning justification criteria, I’d like to point out just how strange Edgerton’s primary justification criterion is in our profession: economic importance. I recommend taking a look because it’s a very quick, concise look at the way he views the history of science and technology.

Edgerton’s criterion has a lot to do with his longstanding effort to show that a 20th century understanding of “science” cannot be separated from the fact that most scientists were involved in the production of technology (but he also claims that this isn’t a new phenomenon). By concentrating on what we view as the crucial problems of “knowledge” we miss out on most of the history of science and its relationship to society. He would argue that we don’t have historiographical gaps to fill–we have an entire cosmos of science that we haven’t even made an effort to understand, because it doesn’t accord to our accepted notions of what is historiographically significant in the history of sci/tech.

Edit: Edgerton sends me along the important caveat that his idea of justification can include many things beyond economic significance, and not just things that can be evaluated quantitatively. This is true, and you’ll find arguments for cultural and political significance as well as economic significance in his work.

I’ve always been most impressed by his frequent arguments for economic significance, though, because so few scholars ever even think to address it.

Us vs. Them: a vacuous revolution?

With the last lecture of History 174 before spring break behind me, it’s time to attend to that semi-annual task here at the AIP: putting together a list of physics-related articles to appear in the past half year for the History Center newsletter. The opportunities for blog posts abound! Aside from the obvious questions about the current state of the history of physics (which I’ll argue about another time), one thing that’s popped out at me is a question I’ve been thinking about, and that is the fallout from the “science wars”. Here’s a crackpot theory: did the science wars serve to make science studies circle the wagons and start seeing the world in terms of a united “us” versus “them”?

Who are “they”? Well, anyone who commits grave historiographical errors, particularly scientist-writers. This occurs to me reading Matt Stanley’s review of three recent Einstein books in the Winter 2008 issue of the recently-renamed Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences (formerly “…in the Physical and Biological Sciences”). Einstein is an incessant font of pop history, which provides trained historians with many opportunities for valid criticism. Here, Stanley criticizes attributions of Einstein’s revolutionary effect on science to Einstein’s revolutionary attitude (among other sins, such as citing the AIP website!).

But, I wonder if this isn’t like picking on the weak kid on the playground. Do we cut ourselves off from internal improvements by attacking outsiders? Is this the reason why we still think it constitutes good scholarship to give the lie to naive positions? Have the science wars morphed into a “1984”-style perpetual war against an unseen enemy? Will it continue until all the reductivist running dogs are eliminated once and for all? Shouldn’t we just let the pop historians do their thing, while we do ours? I mean, it’s not as though articles in HSNS are going to change pop historians’ bad habits.

Matt’s a great historian, and I don’t think he does this, but it still seems to me that attacking weak foes in our professional past or on the outside of the profession will not sharpen our abilities as much as attacking the much stronger scholars within the profession.

This idea is basically the same notion I was working with when discussing the justification for the production of a continual steam of narrow case studies.

Still thinking about blog titles…

I realize this blog has a lame title, but I’ve been waiting for a good title to find me. Preparing my lecture on natural history from Buffon to Darwin, I’m thinking about “Discourse on Style” after Buffon’s discussion of the same name. Too obscure? Is it appropriate to what we’re trying to do here? We’ll see if it still seems like a good idea later on.

Online Debate for Fun

In case you all are wondering what happened to Jenny: A) she’s been in French archives, and we all know what that’s like, and B) she’s trying to organize an online debate featuring some of her Paris colleagues, probably in Google chat, concerning: “some topics in history – methodologies in history, the Enlightenment and philosophical inquiry, British vs. French schools of thought, etc.” So, you know, petty details stuff! Stay tuned for details on date and time. Main points summarized here, but since it’s online all are welcome to take part.

Mirowski’s blog, plus new OK blog

A quick Google search reveals Phil Mirowski is now posting excerpts from his forthcoming book, ScienceMart (with a Haraway-esque “TM” attached to it), online in blog format. Which is lame: in my utopia all blog posts are original off-the-cuff remarks. Still, we’ll link to the Viridiana Jones Chronicles at left. Also, some folks at the University of Oklahoma are putting together a new online grad student journal in the history of science–this is also at left. Looks like 2008 is the year of the blog in history of science.
UPDATE (May 6, 2011): Mirowski’s blog has been closed for some time.

Why we should all read Phil Mirowski

I don’t want things to get too cynical here at the History of Science Blog, so today I want to talk about an author on my top 5 most exciting historians list, Philip Mirowski of Notre Dame (an arch cynic himself). Mirowski does history of economics, and also has a training in economics. Operations research, my speciality, is an area that Mirowski’s done quite a bit of work in, so I’ve had some decent exposure to his work.

Nobody writes like Mirowski. He’s not at all disciplined as a writer (to his detriment) and is extraordinarily sarcastic, especially toward historical actors. He has a strong agenda; namely to demonstrate how economics lost its epistemological soul, which means his work gives off strong whiffs of Whiggism (Steve Fuller points to him as an exemplar of “Tory” history). The place to start with him is unquestionably his compilation, The Effortless Economy of Science? which leads off with his autobiographical reflections, “Confessions of an Aging Enfant Terrible”.

I pretty adamantly disagree with most of Mirowski’s conclusions; I don’t think he takes the epistemology of economic theory seriously on its own terms (we could get into this, but that would take a full-on essay; in short, he feels these terms were borrowed from other fields along with their analytical techniques). But this also reflects why I think Mirowski is so exciting–his arguments are ones that can be disagreed with. No “I write only to highlight a discourse”; no “science is not context-independent” here. His argument runs along the lines of: let me show you, step by arduous step, how the context of economics robbed it of a soul independent from physics and information theory. Stringing piece after piece of evidence together he puts together such a strong narrative that it bleeds into the genre of conspiracy theory.

Mirowski is also an author with an oeuvre–his work is much richer if you read it as part of an ongoing project. As one of only several authors in the history of economics to move beyond the march-of-theories paradigm of writing, he probably waves the sociology of science magic wand a little too strenuously, but he seems to see his primary battle as being with the philosophers of science (again, see Effortless Economy, especially his broadside on Kitcher), and I think the sociologists see themselves as an antidote to the idea that science has a coherent philosophy (he likes his Feyerabend).

As I’ve said, I tend to see the sociologists and philosophers as all of a kind, but unlike a lot of the sociology school, Mirowski functions incredibly well as an historian, too. To get books like More Heat Than Light, and Machine Dreams, close reading is rewarded. History is not merely window dressing on a basic Latourian sociological point. In the case of the latter book, you need to do a lot of brushing up on material behind his narrative to even have a chance of getting what’s going on, because he makes no effort to explain his historical references. But history should hinge on the details, and if an author at least shows how you have to really understand the ins and outs of the history to see what’s going on, that author has done their job. Nobody writing seriously on the history of OR or economic theory can afford to ignore Mirowski’s narratives. I’ll probably say more about the goals of his oeuvre at a later date.

Hobbit History: A Case Study

Fair warning: long post.

Reading over C. S. Lewis’ The Discarded Image, the following passage popped out at me about his opinion of the relationship between medieval literature and medieval conceptions about the historical-philosophical Model of the universe that they had. Seeking to explain “why the authors so gladly present knowledge which most of their audience must have possessed,” he observes: “One gets the impression that medieval people, like Professor Tolkien’s Hobbits, enjoyed books which told them what they already knew.” He tries on a number of theories as to why this might be, but concludes: “The simplest explanation is, I believe, the true one. Poets and other artists depicted these things because their minds loved to dwell on them. Other ages have not had a Model so universally accepted as theirs, so imaginable, and so satisfying to the imagination.”

I think we have a Historical Model about science and context that maybe we just kind of like to remind ourselves about again and again through case study. I will present the case for the prosecution against the 2006 HSS Distinguished Lecture, “The Leopard in the Garden: Life in Close Quarters at the Museum d’Histoire Naturelle” by Richard Burkhardt of UrbanaChampaign, as appearing in the December Isis. The lecture is sort of a behind-the-scenes look at the history of the governance of the museum in the late-18th, early 19th century, especially under George Cuvier. I have nothing against the piece, as such. It’s charming and well written. But I would also claim there’s absolutely no reason to read it because we already know roughly what it says.

We get to the main claim to importance here: “From a somewhat more nuanced perspective [beware the word “nuance” because it will usually alert you to the presence of a nearby “naive position”], we might also think about the power the museum exercised over its scientists. Perhaps by the nature of its resources and practices, it disposed its scientists to think and act in certain ways but not others. Pursuing the phrase in a Foucauldian direction [novel claims are sure to come], we could consider how the museum’s structures and practices served to discipline the French populace, ordering their behavior and fixing their place in the social order.”

This last bit might be sort of interesting, if the significance of the museum could be demonstrated, but the “French populace” never actually appears, nor does the museum directors’ assessment of their impact on the populace. We are largely left to infer the relationship between the museum and the French populace, by the actions of the museum directors and our innate (edit: “enlightened”?) understanding of museums as loci of knowledge/power. He seems to make the connection primarily in the museum’s ability to control the specimens, but, as I say, the effects of this control in the minds of the populace is not dealt with.

Anyway, hijinks ensue for 18 pages until we get to the moral of our story: “In our daily lives, as well as in our historical researches, we are continually reminded of the ways in which the cultivation of scientific knowledge and its dissemination are tied to specific times, places, and interests.” Say it with me, everyone: science is not context-independent.

Yes, it was a wild ride. Agendas were not only politically negotiated, they were also constrained by their material circumstance in ways pretty well consistent with our extant knowledge of the social relations of 19th century natural history. The acceptance of “progressive” scientific theories was resisted by those in positions of political power. Heck, the Hottentot Venus even dropped by for a visit, as much of an opportunity for bourgeois Europeans to project their notions of the exoticness of other races onto her body as ever.

I did learn that the Paris museum did not push Lamarckism, and that in the period of Darwin, it fell back on Lamarckism as a conservative position, so that adds a data point to my understanding of natural history presentation in that era–but that could have been demonstrated in a few sentences. Further, the historical significance of this data point is not clear.

Now, this is a distinguished lecture, which means that it is an opportunity to please an audience tired after a long day of hearing talks, and what better way than by presenting a pleasant story demonstrating unchallenging themes with which we ought to be familiar. So, the piece may say something about history of science audiences, but I would claim that it is actually quite representative of history of science writing regardless of audience, in that demonstration of the influence of social context on scientific knowledge is the key to receiving a polite response; nothing further is required; nothing further will receive particular reward.

Had I been in Vancouver, I’d have probably skipped out to get a beer with my colleagues. Tell me something surprising, and you’ve got my attention. Your honor, the prosecution rests.

Coming soon: Why Philip Mirowski is a mad genius; and Jenny and Will invite some folks over for a debate on French versus Anglophone analytical traditions (if I understand her proposal right). Also, I’d at some point like to take a look at Ronald Binzley’s intriguing case for mid-20th century Catholic science in the same issue of Isis as Burkhardt’s piece.

On the couch: etiquette

In recent analysis, we often make a point of mentioning the emotional or moral qualities of the scientist–what about the emotional or moral qualities of the historian? As more red dots appear on my map, and as I pile on the posts, I start to feel a little nervous about these little grains of thought I’m sending out into the void at a ratio now of about 7 posts to one of Jenny’s. I’ve received some nice encouraging feedback from people I know. But, still, as the only history of science blog that makes a point of talking regularly about what constitutes good and bad (or boring) work, I start to worry that I sound like an ass, and that I’ll never get another job, etc. What is it that makes me so awesome that I can talk about what history should or should not look like?

The long and short of it is that I’m writing as though I were participating in a culture that I wished existed, as though everyone in science studies had their own blog, and traded ideas about what they liked and didn’t like. What I have in mind when I blog is something like the culture of criticism that exists in film or music–not high-minded critical theory, but the hooks and jabs and freestyle speculation that take place at sites like The A. V. Club over topics about what it is we like and don’t like in our pop culture. I’ve encountered this raucous atmosphere when I’ve visited certain places, like Imperial College in London, but I haven’t found it much elsewhere. I have from time to time asked people to justify their work, but if you do that in the wrong crowd, it’s like you’ve kicked their dog. I was once accused of being “uncollegial”–but what makes our little community different from any other community where people get up on a stage and present their creativity to the world? Isn’t it healthy to ask what makes our work worth the price of admission? I want a culture of vigorous criticism because I love what I do, and because when I write, I try to emulate what I like out there (which is a lot), and to avoid what I don’t.

Next: looking at a high profile target–the 2006 HSS Distinguished Lecture. Are we out to reform the world or to fulfill the needs of our audience?