History and Historiography of Science

R. A. Fisher, Scientific Method, and the Tower of Babel, Pt. 2

Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Tower of Babel (1563)
Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Tower of Babel (1563)

In his 1932 lecture, “The Bearing of Genetics on Theories of Evolution,” R. A. Fisher compared the fissures between different scientific techniques to God’s confounding of languages in the Biblical legend of the Tower of Babel. If the fissures in scientific method were assumed to hold the construction of an “edifice” of scientific knowledge back, much as the division of language prevented the construction of the Tower of Babel, then the obvious question was how method could be reunited. According to Fisher,

If we were to ask … what universal language could enable men of science to understand each other sufficiently well for effective co-operation, I submit that there can be only one answer. If we could select a group of men of science, completely purge their minds of all knowledge of language, and allow them time to develop the means of conveying to one another their scientific ideas, I have no doubt whatever that the only successful medium they could devise would be that ancient system of logic and deductive reasoning first perfected by the Greeks, and which we know as Mathematics.

As we saw in Part 1, the bulk of Fisher’s statistical theorization was dedicated to the problem of inductive reasoning, that is, the development of defined conclusions from well-structured observations. But it is clear that Fisher also valued deductive uses of mathematics, because it permitted different observational conclusions to be related to each other through a fully coherent language. It is just not clear what he understood the epistemological status or function of deductive knowledge to be.

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R. A. Fisher, Scientific Method, and the Tower of Babel, Pt. 1

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R. A. Fisher in 1924

For a paper Chris Donohue and I have been working on, I have been delving into the historiography on statistician and genetic theorist R. A. Fisher (1890-1962). The main thing I was trying to do was to make sense of the last third of Fisher’s touchstone book The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930), which is a protracted eugenic explanation for why civilizations decline.  When I first got onto this topic, I consulted Greg Radick about it, and he directed me to Stephen Jay Gould’s 1991 essay, “The Smoking Gun of Eugenics” (reprinted in Gould’s Dinosaur in a Haystack collection), in which Gould takes apart both Fisher’s civilizational theory as well as his 1950s-era arguments against claims that smoking leads to cancer.

If you’re interested in the specifics of Fisher’s arguments, do read Gould’s essay, or, better still, read the original.  Suffice it here to say that Gould claims Fisher made bogus arguments on account of his commitment to eugenics (with a similar story for smoking). This is true, as far as it goes, but I wanted to find a “higher-order” explanation for Fisher’s civilizational theory, which would account for why he thought his arguments made sense.  Fisher, after all, was a famous proponent of methodological rigor, and even prima facie his arguments about civilizational decline were, shall we say, less than rigorous.

If you’re interested in my take, you’ll have to wait until 2014 for the edited volume our essay will be in to come out (hooray for academic publishing; if you’re really interested, please do contact me for a draft copy).  But the general approach I took was to delve into Fisher’s ideas about scientific methodology.  Below the fold I take a meandering tour through these ideas, and the scattered historiography on them.

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Christopher Donohue at Imperial College London on Thursday

University of Maryland PhD student and Ether Wave Propaganda contributor Christopher Donohue has been spending time this academic year in Moscow, at the Poletayev Institute for Theoretical and Historical Studies in the Humanities, which is part of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. This week, he will be passing through London, and on Thursday, 10 January, he will be speaking at Imperial College London’s CHoSTM seminar. The seminar will be held, as usual, from 4 to 6pm at the Seminar and Learning Centre (SALC) on the 5th floor of the Sherfield Building in South Kensington. His talk is titled:

From ‘Natural Selection’ to ‘Social Selection’: The Differentiation and Career of a Concept in Early Twentieth-Century Social Thought.

Abstract below the fold

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Five Years in the Blog

Ether Wave Propaganda opened for business on New Year’s Day 2008, which makes it five years old today. At that time, it was one of a handful of blogs on the history of science. As the links on the right show, that number has increased markedly. Given the limitations in format and turnaround time in humanities publication, this always seemed like a promising format for scholarly communication, and I’m pleased to see that others have picked up on this point.

Still, I think there remains a lot of untapped potential in the format. For one thing, I think many more scholars need to take it up, if only to keep others apprised of what they’re up to: what talks they give, what publications are in process, what archives are being visited. At present, vague faculty web pages (with, horror, incomplete publication lists) and rumor and hearsay seem to be the most prevalent means of keeping up-to-date in our profession.

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CHoSTM Moving to King’s College London

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This has been a pretty terribly kept secret, but now that the arrangements have been settled and the press release is out, us folks at Imperial can finally officially say: this summer the Centre for the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine is moving a couple of miles east to the History Department at King’s College London, where the intention is to expand it into a major center for historical research in our field — the official press release (which you can read below the fold, or at the King’s news site) compares it to Harvard, MIT, and Cambridge.

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Louis Ridenour’s “Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse” (1945)

One of the persistent anxieties of the nuclear age has been the possibility of a catastrophic war starting accidentally.  The scale of destruction that can be delivered in a short space of time means that any defense and counter-attack would have to be mounted so quickly that a counter-attack could be triggered by false evidence of attack.  In fact, a Soviet colonel has just won an award from Germany for not responding when, in 1983, his early-warning systems indicated the launch of five missiles from United States territory.  (The incident first became public in 1998.)  That warning had been triggered by a satellite receiving confusing signals from reflected solar light.

The “big board” leads us astray once again: cartoon accompanying “Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse” Milwaukee Journal, December 26, 1945 (click for original via Google News).

There have, of course, been other such incidents in fact and fiction — of the latter, the films Dr. Strangelove and Fail-Safe (both 1964) are canonical.  When I was researching my dissertation, though, I was surprised to learn that the notion of accidental nuclear war extends all the way back to 1945.  While working in the Library of Congress archives, I stumbled on a November 1945 draft of a darkly humorous playlet written by physicist Louis Ridenour called “Pilot Lights of the Apocalypse”.  The scenario is almost exactly the same as later incidents, real and imagined.  In this case, San Francisco is struck by an earthquake, which triggers a false alarm in an operations room buried beneath the city, prompting a “hysterical” colonel to launch a counter-strike against Denmark, who then launches a strike against Sweden, and so on into oblivion.

The playlet was published in Fortune, of all places, in January 1946.  It’s not unknown today, but it’s not widely known either.  Thanks to Google, you can read a copy of it online from the December 26, 1945 Milwaukee Journal (Merry Christmas, Milwaukee).  Discussion below the fold.

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In Athens on Friday

On Friday, 2 November, I will be giving a talk in Athens at the Fifth International Conference of the European Society for the History of Science. The talk will be entitled “The Polemical Construction of an American Style of Scientific Policy Analysis”. For some odd reason I’m listed in the program by my actual first name, Gerald, but it’s me. The talk is part of a small session on “Transnational Economic Science after World War II”, which will also include Tiago Mata and Till Düppe, whom you may know as contributors to the History of Economics Playground blog. Unfortunately, Catherine Herfeld won’t be able to make it.

Albert Wohlstetter (1913-1997)  Image from LIFE photo archive, © Time Inc.

The talk derives from my book manuscript, and it will be about how certain approaches to policy analysis started to be identified as American circa 1960. Part of the answer is that things like “game theory” and “strategic theory” were American. But part of the answer is that it became convenient for certain authors, such as the British physicist and nuclear pundit Patrick Blackett, to portray American policy positions with which they disagreed as the product of a peculiarly abstract “American” style of thinking. This style was often identified with academic economists, and understood to be disengaged from the work of people with practical experience, as well as from any realistic appreciation of human behavior. In subsequent years, the polemical origins of this claim have been forgotten, but historians still deploy it, or a version of it, as a tool of analysis.

However, the polemical tactic was actually recognized as such at the time, particularly by RAND Corporation policy analyst Albert Wohlstetter, who is best known for his 1959 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Delicate Balance of Terror” (RAND memo version here). Whatever one might think of his policy positions, Wohlstetter definitely had a keen critical sense. I would point particularly to an aptly titled 1964 essay, “Sin and Games in America”,* in which he scathingly took apart Blackett’s and others’ polemical claims about the nature and assumptions of game theory, its relationship to policy analysis and, specifically, to his and others’ policy positions.

*In Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 209-225. A similar critique can be found in an article called “Scientists, Seers, and Strategy,” one version of which was published in Foreign Affairs, another version in a 1964 book called Scientists and National Policy-Making

Modernity, the Cold War, and New Whig Histories of Ideas, Pt. 2

This post is an interlude in my look at Cold War Social Science. It paves the way for further discussion of that book, but contains no reference to its contents.

A new whig historiography of the social sciences, which I began to describe in part 1, posits a crucial role for intellectual figures’ ideas in history. These ideas need not be the source of the broader (non-intellectualized) ideas that drive social and political trends. Intellectuals’ ideas do, however, at least have the power to reinforce such trends by helping to prevent alternative ideas from instigating change. Thus, in this historiography, past intellectuals’ ideas tend to be illiberal ideas.

The historiography is whiggish rather than anti-intellectual in that it is constructed from the narratives of intellectuals who purport to represent the advent of a genuinely liberating intellectual movement. To understand the narrative features of this historiography, it is important to understand how it retains elements of narratives generated by a long line of purportedly liberating intellectual movements, and how it claims to diverge from them.

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At the ETH Zürich on Monday

The “tau” of physics (image from nobelprize.org)

On Monday, 1 October, at 10am, I will be giving a seminar at the Chair for Science Studies (I guess that’s what they call a department) of the ETH in Zürich on the practices of particle detection.  I assume if you are in Zürich and you read this blog you will already know about this, but, if not, contact the department (or Max Stadler, a product of Imperial CHoSTM, by the way) for details.

The seminar will be based on my new paper “Strategies of Detection: Interpretive Methods in Experimental Particle Physics, 1930–1950,” which is forthcoming in the November issue of Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences.  The paper is basically a deep engagement with Peter Galison’s ideas, on his own territory of particle physics, concerning how “mesoscopic” histories of scientific practices can be written and developed.  I blogged a little on this subject back in 2009.  At a more nitty-gritty level, the paper also makes some new points about how cloud chamber images were interpreted, how nuclear physics knowledge was used to narrow ranges of possible interpretations of experiments using all kinds of detectors, and how interpretive practices changed markedly before and after new discoveries became routine rather than resisted (I argue, in particular, that the rise of “decay mode” analysis marked a major break in interpretive practice).  I’ll write more about this here after the article’s out.

Policy Lunchbox Slides

My slides from Wednesday’s Policy Lunchbox talk, “Science Policy History: Data Points, Morality Tale, or Precedent?” are available here (5MB). A crucial point, not apparent from the slides, is that neither historians nor policy analysts really have done the hard work to make the use of historical precedent in policy discussions practicable.  This is a vision of a possible future, not something we can easily do right now.  But this is something that lawyers must do as a matter of course — without a mastery of precedent, they will simply lose their cases.

I had a couple of very good questions from the audience on what timeframes would be most useful for precedent analysis (I would say the last 20-30 years is the most important, but that doesn’t mean you can’t gain insights from going further back), and what sorts of things policy people would need to do to make such use of history possible (keep policy documents organized and available, particularly via the web, and do in-depth interviews with key parties, sealed for a period of time, if need be).

For examples of work that at least points in this direction, I suggested the work of Naomi Oreskes (naturally), and Imperial’s Abigail Woods, dealing with foot-and-mouth disease. Any other suggestions?