History and Historiography of Science

Back Up and Running Soon….

*emerges from ocean, shakes off saltwater, untangles self from seaweed, sits down at keyboard*

Having let my posting schedule get away from me anyway, I’ve decided that the time was ripe to put EWP aside for the moment to do some table clearing.  And, miraculously, the tables are starting to look clear!  My class will be on break until the New Year after Monday, so I anticipate getting back on the posting bandwagon soon thereafter.  In the meantime, if you’re interested in matters nuclear, you very much need to check out Restricted Data, a blog by Alex Wellerstein, a former colleague of mine from Harvard, as well as my successor in the postdoctoral slot at the AIP History Center.  Alex has amassed a lot of archival material over the years, and is now putting miscellaneous, extremely well-explained bits of it up at a very quick pace.

*sighs, takes deep breath, jumps back into ocean…*

Available Now in Centaurus: My Review of Helge Kragh’s Higher Speculations

I don’t believe I have permission to republish here, but my review of Helge Kragh’s book, Higher Speculations: Grand Theories and Failed Revolutions in Physics and Cosmology is available in Centaurus 53 (2011): 342-343, or online here (paywall, but if your library, like mine, doesn’t subscribe, you can see a scan of about 1/3 of the review for free).

I was very happy to get the chance to review the book, because Kragh’s industriousness, his technical understanding, and his interest in a wide array of subjects make him one of the most exciting historians of physics working today.  My review makes quite a bit of the fact that the volume feels like more of an outline of a future history than a filled-out history along the lines of Kragh’s Cosmology and Controversy (1996).  So it contains a lot of discussion of how these sketches could be pulled together into a more synthetic account.  I would like to repeat a point I make at the end of the review, which is that this is intended more in the vein of engagement than criticism.  If you’re interested in putting the latest multi-verse scenarios into the context of the longstanding history of physical speculation, this is your book.

Live at Leeds: Maximum HPS

Thanks to everyone from Leeds — and Manchester! — for coming out, and for the fine hospitality.  Good night, and see you next time!

Apologies for the lack of substantive posts lately.  My new introduction to the history of science course is starting on Monday, and I’m now in the final stages of overhauling my book manuscript.  Priorities, you know.  Also, I’m heading up to the University of Leeds on Wednesday to kick off the seminar season with a talk entitled “Perspectives on the Possibility for a Science of Policy after World War II”, 3:15pm in the Department of Philosophy, Baines Wing G36 (alas, I don’t think I could fill the Refectory!).  Do come around if you happen to be in the neighborhood.

My book (present title: Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960) is on a topic that has received a decent amount of attention.  But, to my mind, this attention seems mainly hung up on the idea that the history being told must hinge on some variation on the standard “what happens when you try to apply science to policy?” question.  This was a point I originally made in a BJHS article back in 2007.  My talk will boil down the central point of my book, which is that we need to distinguish different scientific activities from each other, and start to understand how they were built around different tasks, different methods, different notions of what gave knowledge integrity as “science”, how that integrity related to practical decision-making, and what implications that had (or, more often, did not have) for polity in general.  Most significantly, these differing ideas complemented not only each other but traditional decision-making methods, probably more often than they were in competition.

Merton on the Reception of Watson’s The Double Helix

For many decades now, various critics have supposed that the relations between science and society suffer because of the prevalence of an unrealistic view of science as something that is abstract and dehumanized. This supposition licenses the critics to deploy therapeutically realistic images of science to deliver their audience from their false idols into a state of mature understanding.

In his paper, “Should the History of Science Be Rated X?” Science 183 (1974): 1164-1172, Stephen Brush supposed the history of science could play just such a “subversive” role in science education. At that same time, according to some stories, the history of science itself had to be rescued from ne’er-do-well myth-spinners working as philosophers of science, Mertonian sociologists, and, of course, American scientists justifying their work to society and Congress.

All of this overlooks the fact that our entire society had already been freed from its illusions by James Watson’s best-selling 1968 memoir, The Double Helix.

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Sociology and History: Shapin on the Merton Thesis

This post will mainly focus on Steven Shapin’s “Understanding the Merton Thesis” Isis 79 (1988): 594-605, which may be my favorite work by him.

Robert K. Merton’s “functionalist” sociology viewed “science” as a kind of Weberian ideal type — a form of thought that is identifiable by its peculiar, philosophically-defined characteristics. Merton’s sociology of science held that this thought could also be identified with social behaviors, characterized by a set of “norms”, which made the thought possible.

The Merton Thesis (which slightly predates Merton’s enumeration of science’s norms) holds that the rise of science in early-modern England could be linked to the social behaviors valued by the Puritanism of that milieu. This was the subject of Merton’s PhD thesis and his 1938 book Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England.

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Harry Collins, Methodological Relativism, and Sociological Explanation, Pt. 2

In my previous post on Harry Collins’ ideas about “methodological relativism”, I discussed how in the early 1980s Collins began explicitly using relativism as a “natural attitude” that could be used to produce “sociological explanations” of scientists’ behavior.  Methodological relativism was premised on a clear delineation of tasks, which makes it appropriate for the sociologist, but not for scientists.

However, this delineation of tasks remained incomplete: in particular, the relationship between sociology, philosophy, and history of science remained confusingly unresolved.  Further, it was unclear what sociological fruits would actually be obtained via methodological relativism.  Finally, it left unclear what the relationship was supposed to be between the sociology of scientific knowledge and the more general sociology of knowledge, upon which STS appears to be based.

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Holiday & Introductory Course

I am going to be doing some traveling for the next couple of weeks, and so there are likely to be no new posts in that time.  In other news, starting in October, I will be teaching a year-long introduction to the history of science course here at Imperial.  I’ve included a tentative lecture schedule and reading list below the fold.  This isn’t set in stone yet, so comments and suggestions are welcome.

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Harry Collins, Methodological Relativism, and Sociological Explanation, Pt. 1

When I was at SEESHOP5 in Cardiff last month, I had an opportunity to talk a little with Harry Collins about the history of his work, its relationship to the history of science, relativism, radicalism, and STS.

People involved in Collins’ “Sociology of Expertise and Experience” (SEE) project would like their work to inform future STS scholarship.  However, by their estimate, STS has been reluctant to take up SEE.  This has led the SEE crowd to chart their own course, distinguishing their work as committed to a constructive deliberation about the nature and social operation of expertise, which they would contrast to an argumentation-averse, and ultimately nonconstructive critical orthodoxy prevailing in STS.

Now, STS distinguishes itself by a sort of ambivalently* radical relativist intellectual position, descending from the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) project of the late-1970s and 1980s.  By attempting to define the bounds of expert authority, the SEE project is often taken to be a retreat from STS-brand radicalism to a more traditional set of ideas about expertise.  It has sometimes been paired with Bruno Latour’s own apparent retreat (pdf) around the same time as the SEE project got started, in the early 2000s.

Collins denies that SEE represents any shift in his critical position: for him it is just a shift to a different methodology and a different sort of problem. 

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Online Humanities Scholarship beyond the Digital Humanities

I have been working a lot on revising my book this summer — its second major overhaul — and so I have had ample opportunity to reflect on (gnash teeth, rend garments over…) how truly heinous the process of publishing in the humanities is, and what alternatives/additions might be preferable.

Basically, I like history books.  I am very eager for my work on the “sciences of policy” (operations research, management science, decision theory, systems analysis…) to appear in book form.  I think the strength of the material comes out most clearly when it is presented as a synthetic picture, and I think a book might be bought by those involved in these sciences who are interested in the history but would never read historical journal articles on the topic.  Plus, books are crucial to professional advancement.

However, I think the publishing process for both books and papers is incredibly stultifying to scholarly work.  The key problem is delay. 

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Going SEESHOPping

SEE icon

When I first started EWP in 2008, I labored under the misapprehension that historians of science were not only interested in the details of arguments taking place in other areas of science studies, but that those details actually played a large part in setting historiographical priorities.  In that spirit, I did an eight-part Q&A with Harry Collins and Rob Evans over their new “third wave of science studies” project, Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE).

I first encountered the early SEE papers when I was finishing up work on my dissertation.  Then and now, I have found traditional science studies models to be unhelpful in untangling the methods and sources of legitimacy in the “sciences of policy” that I study.  SEE seemed to be closer to the mark.  I would not go so far as to say that I have ever been particularly invested in the SEE program, or that I use its ideas actively.  It has a lot of components — such as debating the use of “hawk-eye” technology in tennis, or playing “imitation games”, or developing a deep well of analytical concepts — that are beyond the pale of what I do as a historian.  However, I do view SEE as compatible with my historical work, and was therefore eager to do a bit of promotion, since I still thought if historians were not very united by interlinking their research projects, they were united by conceptual concerns that informed their research and writing.

I now believe that historians’ interest in conceptual debates is not actually very deep either.  These debates seem to play a vaguely inspirational role, more a matter of footnotes and casual conversation than real engagement.  To my mind this isn’t a huge tragedy, because I believe it is a lack of synthetic work rather than a lack of conceptual resources that most constrains historical work today.  Still, I remain intrigued by the lack of any real historical component to the SEE program.  And so I am currently typing up a paper on this subject to present at the Fifth International Workshop on Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEESHOP5) in Cardiff, the weekend of June 10.

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