{"id":14389,"date":"2016-04-13T23:14:07","date_gmt":"2016-04-14T03:14:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/etherwave.wordpress.com\/?p=14389"},"modified":"2016-04-13T23:14:07","modified_gmt":"2016-04-14T03:14:07","slug":"for-my-zilsel-friends-more-thoughts-on-a-bad-category-pseduoscience","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/2016\/04\/13\/for-my-zilsel-friends-more-thoughts-on-a-bad-category-pseduoscience\/","title":{"rendered":"For My Zilsel Friends, The Dissenting Sciences"},"content":{"rendered":"

I. Some Opening Thoughts On My Motivations<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

My friends at Zilsel<\/a>\u00a0have invited me to speak on a topic which I have been working on for quite some time, through my various researches in biosocial anthropology<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0human behavioral ecology, behavior genetics and public choice economics (in the work of Gordon Tullock <\/a>especially) the “dissenting sciences.” I keep changing my mind on what to call them, having referred to them as “heterodox” and “pariah” sciences. \u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I am a bit in a muddle and I have decided to write my way out of this confusion. I have submitted two introductions to introduce my case studies. \u00a0This is a version of those introductions.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"
Writing on the Pseudosciences<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

I do this because our field not only suffers from the privacy of criticism but also the privacy of ideas. \u00a0As Will has written about many times, historians of science are too concerned with only publishing their very polished thoughts.\u00a0<\/span>This means that much of the knowledge of the profession is hidden from public view. This behavior is elitist. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

And now everyone reading this hopefully has a better sense of my motivations. \u00a0My thoughts on pseudoscience are a bit of a muddle, I am using this blog as a way to puzzle out this muddle, as a prelude to puzzling out some of my confusions in a talk on Tuesday. \u00a0I am deliberately not holding back my unpolished thoughts in the hopes that others will do so.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

II. \u00a0Pseudoscience and Science are Intermixed: The Case of Phrenology<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Here are my issues: how to define pseudoscience and how to determine the characteristics of “not pseudoscience” or science, and how to address my case studies which are somehow neither scientific nor pseudoscience. \u00a0Agassi’s philosophical anthropology<\/a> in particular underscores that science and pseudoscience are intermixed. \u00a0But he really does not address the problem further than that. \u00a0I think for many this is enough.<\/span><\/p>\n

But I for one would like some clarity on this issue. \u00a0 To begin with there are many, many works on the status of the pseudosciences. \u00a0A wonderful book edited by\u00a0Bryan Farha<\/a> notes that the common characteristics of the pseudosciences are: 1) overuse of adhoc hypothesis to escape refutation 2) absence of self-correction 3) emphasis on confirmation 4) over-reliance on anecdote 5) obscurity. \u00a0These characteristics to describe pseudosciences quite well according to their own definitions. Accounts of pseudoscience are infused with Popperian methodology, given Popper’s contributions to our understanding of pseudoscience. \u00a0My case studies pose issues according to these criteria. Gordon Tullock writes very well and very clearly. \u00a0He has no add hoc hypothesis. Other examples: behavior genetics is in the process of self-correction. A more important point: all modern sciences break the above criteria. \u00a0But, of course, not all the time. \u00a0But enough to make problems for this definition.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

So, conceptually pseudosciences are a huge mess: what does pseudoscience mean, exactly? Pseudosciences are usually considered to be in some ways anti-scientific or “not science.” But pseudo<\/em> means having the attributes of science, but not functioning in the same way that science functions. \u00a0Pseudo sciences are at most “fake” sciences, not “non” sciences. Furthermore, the given examples of pseudoscience are usually quite limited. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the nineteenth century, phrenology was considered by many to be a pseudoscience. \u00a0Alchemy too was or is considered a pseudoscience. \u00a0Phrenology was the early 19th century inquiry into the connections between brain (as matter) and mind (as faculty of cognition). \u00a0The phrenological work by the Fowlers<\/a> is in many ways exemplary.<\/span> We now look at phrenology as nonsense. Rightly so. Phrenology was absolutely wrong. \u00a0But many of the reactions to its ideas were fruitful. \u00a0This was also why the debunking of phrenology was so necessary, it lead to some very good ideas. In refutation, there is growth. \u00a0I know here I am being overly Popperian.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0Many contemporaries, particularly in France, ranked phrenology with \u201cnecromancy, alchemy and astrology.\u201d<\/a> But the discipline of anthropology<\/a> in the United States found the tenets of phrenology very useful to say what it was not.<\/span> \u00a0What phrenology is, anthropology is not. \u00a0Therefore anthropology is better. \u00a0Phrenology thus provided anthropology with a theodicy, an account of evil. Did phrenology provide inspiration to many who then had careers in psychology and medicine? Of course, this is unprovable, but possibly. \u00a0As importantly, although it was close to \u201cnecromancy\u201d to many, phrenology privileged the unity of the human species. This was not necessarily an argument against hierarchical racism, but the plurality of species was an argument for hierarchical racism in the 19th century.<\/span>\u00a0 <\/span><\/span>Many critiques of phrenology centered around how it was a poor copy of proper scientific reasoning. \u00a0This is very important. \u00a0Phrenology was scientistic, taking on the outward attributes of science but learning none of its lessons. \u00a0The excesses of phrenology lead in the nineteenth century (especially in neurology, medicine, psychology and anthropology) to useful self-reflections. \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Phrenology by providing a theodicy, a bed time story for young scientists, a threat if they did not eat their supper, served a good purpose. Do pseudosciences have a purpose in this regard? absolutely. \u00a0They tell the developing sciences (like physical anthropology) how they should conduct themselves, aka not like phrenology.<\/span><\/p>\n

III. In Critiques of Pseudoscience and Among Individuals Whose Work is Called\u00a0Pseudo-scientific, An Unrealistic Account of Science Emerges\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Phrenology, as I mentioned above, served a useful purpose. \u00a0It impacted the course of social science. \u00a0But if pseudoscience assists in the development of science, what is the divide between science and pseudoscience? We must also keep in mind another series of related issues. \u00a0In every pseudoscience, be it phrenology (and according to many minds) astrology or studies of ESP (extra-sensory perception, or the science of “Ghostbusters”), there is an envy of science. \u00a0There is a among pseudoscientists an unrealistic picture of consensus in science and of how science works, of what science can accomplish and with what evidence. Phrenology constructed a grand system from little evidence. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As importantly, among critics of pseudoscience, there is an unrealistic account of science as well. \u00a0Science in both accounts is “normal.” Science is a utopia. It is Kuhnian. Along these lines there is an alternate conception of pseudosciences which has emerged recently, that of misbehaving sciences<\/a>\u00a0by Aaron Panofsky.\u00a0 Misbehaving sciences, such as behavior genetics, one of my case studies, are “misbehaving” because there is: no consensus among misbehaving sciences of the core tenants of their inquiry; a loose sense of professionalization, of proper pedagogy and institutionalization; a tendency to politicize claims and to make them extravagant; endless public controversies, a constant fight over resources, and anomie.<\/span><\/p>\n

This account of misbehaving sciences is in many ways wonderful. \u00a0It is clear and provocative. It is however simply unworkable. \u00a0In the first instance it underplays to a fantastic degree the role and presence of dissent and disagreement in normal sciences. Panofsky considers a certain level of disagreement good, above a certain level, destructive. Criticism and controversy are then presented as foreign to functioning science. \u00a0Panofsky does not say this but this an extension of his argument. \u00a0 This is very Kuhnian. One can also make a very good argument that many of the features that Panofsky presents are present in all “behaving” sciences. \u00a0He very much has an idea that dissent and disagreement in science are pathological or can become so at the shortest notice. This underplays the role of dissent in the growth of scientific knowledge as well. \u00a0In any case, although Panofsky does interesting work, he too presents an unrealistic account of science which trivializes dissent and presents disagreement as pathological to science.<\/span><\/p>\n

IV. Some Solutions<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Let us not discuss pseudoscience for the moment. \u00a0If the line between science and pseudo is vague and pseudo can be productive, let us rid ourselves of this term. \u00a0It is too confusing. \u00a0But how can we describe properly inquiries, personalities and methodological insights \u00a0in the social sciences which are, 1) not only are not rejected by the majority of the profession in a field (such as economics, anthropology and psychology) but also are, 2) due to their rejection by the majority, fervently accepted by a minority (who still call themselves economists). \u00a0I call them dissenting sciences<\/em>. <\/span>\u00a0This gives proper honor to the inquiries I address. \u00a0It gives them proper space within the sciences they critique (and from the inquiries they sometimes loathe.) <\/span><\/p>\n

I also put my cards up front. Anthropology is a science. If it was not, the dispute between monogenesis and polygenesis<\/a> would still be raging. \u00a0But it is not. Economics is also a science. This is easier to defend.<\/span><\/p>\n

Dissenting sciences acknowledges that they are very fully formed communities of practitioners, with established social networks and peer review journals, institutional affiliations, etc. Dissenting acknowledges that they are at a social, institutional and intellectual distance from the \u201ccenter\u201d and the intellectual consensus of the field. All three of my case studies wish to reform the field from within. \u00a0They express disappointment, even bewilderment, when their work is not adopted by others in their field.. \u00a0These dissenting sciences are also extraordinarily strident, even vicious in their exchanges within their fields. But viciousness, though painful and unfortunate, is to be an expected part of any modern science. Viciousness is a case a bad manners.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

My case studies (behavior genetics<\/span>, human behavioral ecology<\/span>, and public choice economics<\/a><\/span>) are somewhat good for their fields (mostly). Public choice, the most; human behavioral ecology, the least. Social anthropology has benefited from its disputes with Chagnon. Behavior genetics is reemerging into respectability<\/a>. I shall explain further in a subsequent entry. All three, as I shall explain later, do a great deal to keep out virulent racism, among other things. \u00a0Public choice economics, human behavior ecology and evolutionary psychology, through their own disciplinary and community dynamics keep out more destructive elements, as they police their own borders and lament the state of their respective fields. \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

By looking at the dissenting sciences, we shall have a clear idea of non-sciences. Non-sciences are truly destructive. \u00a0Here is an example, the work of Richard Lynn<\/a>, and another \u00a0<\/a>\u00a0in the work of Arthur Jensen.\u00a0I shall explain non-sciences too. The work of Lynn and Jensen allows me to make a very clear point. Although I enjoy dissent and think dissenting sciences important, I think it necessary to the proper conduct of science, there must be criteria for refutation, criticism and even debunking. If not, if we just embrace lazy pluralism, Paul Feyerabend is right and we should shut down hospitals and see shamans for broken bones.<\/span><\/p>\n

V. More on The Dissenting Sciences<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Very interestingly, in each of my case sciences, there is a dogmatic insight at the root of departure of the founders in the field from the main tenets of economics, anthropology, and social psychology. \u00a0This is often explained biographically.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, Gordon Tullock and Napoleon Chagnon both have Pauline conversions and have written about it especially. \u00a0At root of both men’s conversions is a methodological insight. \u00a0This insight is then used to castigate the rest of the field. It is they who see clearly. \u00a0It is the rest of their field which do not. \u00a0Persecution of members in inquiries by the rest of their field is taken to be a test and proof of sincerity. The more criticism was heaped upon Napoleon Chagnon, the more that he was convinced he was correct. \u00a0<\/span><\/span>Tullock, much to the complaint of many, could never disentangle personal anecdote from intellectual work. Chagnon published a polemic autobiography<\/a>.<\/span> \u00a0Robin Fox <\/a>(a fellow traveler of Chagnon\u2019s and a fierce critic of social anthropology along similar if distinctive lines which I shall explain) has also published a pugilistic and literary autobiography<\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Regardless of these personal dynamics, public choice economics and my other case studies produce works which are extremely interesting, they are sometimes correct. \u00a0They are provocative, full of good ideas. Nothing is better than a wrong idea. I borrow this sentiment from Joseph Agassi, who says much the same of metaphysics.<\/span>\u00a0 All three of my case studies are like metaphysical systems. \u00a0Perhaps they are wrong or strange, but in reading and thinking about them, you are left with more knowledge<\/span>. You are able to approach any inquiry or field with new ideas. \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, in sum, they draw from heroic, self-fashioned personalities who act as \u201cfounders,\u201d key methodological insights and very entrenched metaphysical commitments. I enumerate these features for each. \u00a0For public choice economics they are: 1) the figure of Gordon Tullock 2) the inherent failure of government intervention 3) the idea that man in every decision economizes and that all behavior can be understood in some way through basic economic models (game theory.) For behavior genetics: 1) the figure of <\/span>Steven Vandenberg<\/span> \u00a02) the failure of social forces to explain human behavior 3) the causal power of genes and genetics. \u00a0And for human behavioral ecology they are, 1) the figures of William Irons and Napoleon Chagnon 2) the failure of social anthropology to explain \u201cprimitive\u201d human social behavior 3) the insights of theoretical population genetics in the work of W.D. Hamilton. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Last, there is a frequent Popperian tinge to the dissenting sciences today as well as a critique of relativism embedded in all three. Historically, all three come from the post-war developments in biology and economic and statistical methodology. <\/span><\/p>\n

In my next entry I shall discuss more this idea of the \u201cdissenting\u201d science. \u00a0I will also take each dissenting science and describe them, their founders and their histories in much finer detail. \u00a0I will also outline more the traditions, methods, and persons which they dissent: social psychology , Keynesian macroeconomics and social anthropology.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I. Some Opening Thoughts On My Motivations My friends at Zilsel\u00a0have invited me to speak on a topic which I have been working on for quite some time, through my various researches in biosocial anthropology\u00a0and\u00a0human behavioral ecology, behavior genetics and public choice economics (in the work of Gordon Tullock especially) the “dissenting sciences.” I keep<\/p>\n

Continue Reading… For My Zilsel Friends, The Dissenting Sciences<\/span>Continue Reading…<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nf_dc_page":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2,8,18,19,30],"tags":[538,1105,1160,1299,1423],"class_list":["post-14389","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-20th-century-science-historiography","category-commentary-track","category-history-of-economic-thought","category-history-of-the-human-sciences","category-the-unified-theory-of-christophers-scholarly-interests","tag-gordon-tullock","tag-napoleon-chagnon","tag-paul-feyerabend","tag-robin-fox","tag-thomas-kuhn"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14389","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14389"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14389\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14389"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14389"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rational-action.com\/etherwave\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14389"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}